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WHAT IN THE HELL DID THEY DO TO THE CAV(U) ARMY WAR
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
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This essay reviews the salient aspects of the Army General Board, European Theater of Operations which was convened after World War II to make recommendations on Army organization and doctrine. The essay focuses specifically on the cavalry aspects of two of the studies: The Armored Division and Mechanized Cavalry Units. These aspects are then used to evaluate current and proposed cavalry organizations, missions and doctrine.		

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

WHAT IN THE HELL DID THEY DO TO THE CAV?

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald L. Baker, Jr.
Armor

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
28 April 1983

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ABSTRACT

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A review of studies conducted by The Army General Board, European Theater of Operations pertaining to organization, missions and doctrine of armored cavalry units. Paper evaluates findings versus future cavalry organization, missions and doctrine.



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WHAT IN THE HELL DID THEY DO TO THE CAV?

"G-3, I want the Cav Squadron to move into the line and replace the 3d brigade tonight. We'll pull the 3d brigade into assembly areas behind the 2d brigade, resupply them and then tomorrow night we'll make a two brigade attack to the East through the first brigade. If the enemy is anywhere close to being as bad off as you say, G-2, we'll bust a hole big enough to put a whole corps into the enemy's rear."

"God! This is great," thought the new division commander.

"Just what I've been waiting for all these years. Granted, the new organizations and some of the equipment are new to me. Maybe I should have followed the Army's reorganization a little closer back in the early eighties. What the hell? It's 1988 and we're doing good so far."

"Excuse me sir," the G-3 said breaking the silence, "the Cav Squadron can't perform that mission without some help."

"What do you mean?" the commander asked perplexed.

"Well sir, when we went under the new organization the Cav Squadron was lightened up."

"I know that Colonel," the two star remarked. "Two air troops and two ground troops."

"Yes sir, but the problem is with the ground troops; they don't have any tanks."

"That's a problem General," the G-2 interrupted, "This enemy tank unit right here, as you can see, is to the rear of the front line, kind of on the boundary between our two forward brigades. If he stays there OK. If he attacks to the northwest into the first brigade area that's OK too. If

attacks to the southwest after the cav has replaced the 3d brigade we've got problems. Right G-3?"

"That's for sure, General. The cav doesn't have enough combat power to stop him. You will have to use units from the 2d or 3d brigade to react. Probably at least one battalion task force or maybe two depending on how many tanks he has left in that unit."

"Damn it, what about the air cavalry troops, can't they help?"

"Yes sir, they are super but here's the problem we've been having. The enemy has been using the woods as much as possible. He gets in there and the helicopters have a hell of a time dealing with him. The cav fighting vehicles are a help in finding him but their antitank systems don't work too well in the trees."

"Besides sir, the G-2 broke in, if they move at night or during restricted visibility the air cavalry still has problems in spite of all our new technology. Our loss rate goes up substantially."

"Well what are our options, G-3?"

"Sir, you can leave the battalion task force that is currently located on that major avenue of approach in place and use the two ground cavalry troops to screen the rest of the 3d brigade sector. You could reinforce the cav with additional combat power, at least a tank company and a mechanized company. Or you could gamble and go ahead and put the cav in there and hope that the enemy reacts to your attack by moving northwest and doesn't try to come into our rear and then turn north."

"OK, give me a few minutes to think about this. By the way G-3, what in the hell did they do to the cav? They used to be able to fight on their own."

"Here is an armor general asking me what in the hell did they do to cav?" thought the G-3. "Well General," he answered, its a long story."

The answer to this long story lies in the work done by armor leaders who commanded our armor units in World War II. Immediately after the end of the war a general board was created by United States Forces, Europe in June of 1945. The purpose of the board was to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater. This board was comprehensive and covered all aspects of the war.

Two of the studies are significant to the cavalry. Both studies were prepared under the auspices of Brigadier General J. A. Holly, Chief of the Armored section. Study Number 48, "The Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division" and Study Number 49, "The Tactics, Employment, Technique, Organization, and Equipment of Mechanized Cavalry Units" provided the groundwork for postwar cavalry organizations. The mechanized cavalry study was the genesis of modern cavalry organizations. That is until the Division 86 Cavalry Squadron came along.

There is no reason to believe that much of the information obtained by the board and the recommendations made by it are not valid today. World War II was, after all, the last major war involving large scale use of armor and cavalry units. Certainly the lessons learned should not be lost simply by the passing of time. It is the purpose of this paper to review the findings of the armor section as they pertain to cavalry units and to discuss changes to doctrine and proposed organizations based upon invaluable combat experience.

The methodology used by the General Board was very sound. Information was gathered by questionnaires sent to combat leaders, from generals through second lieutenants; interviews were conducted; after action reports were

studied and meetings were held to review data acquired and recommend postwar organizations.

Brigadier General Holly, as mentioned earlier, chaired both groups working on the armored division and mechanized cavalry studies. Only one other officer served as a member of both groups, an armored infantry lieutenant colonel. The armored division study had a total of seven officers--one armored field artillery colonel, three cavalry colonels and one infantry colonel plus the general and infantry lieutenant colonel. The cavalry study had eight officers. In addition to the two already mentioned there were two cavalry colonels, three cavalry lieutenant colonels and a cavalry lieutenant.

Each group also had several principal consultants. These officers represented staff sections, technical services (signal, quartermaster etc.), medical service, and the other combat arms such as antiaircraft artillery and combat engineers. Chaplains were also included. Obviously, any study of armor or cavalry would definitely need a chaplain's input.

Turning to the studies themselves the armored division study is important to cavalry for the following reason:

Junior Officers who actually commanded battalions, companies, and platoons in combat were questioned on the details of the various company organizations (see Appendix 5). Their opinions are reflected in the organization charts of tank, rifle, and battalion headquarters' companies and will not be further discussed.¹

Combat leaders at the unit level had input on the future organization of the battalions to include the reconnaissance units. Although the questionnaire used was not too detailed their answers lend some insight as to why cavalry (reconnaissance) units were structured as a combined arms team.

The questionnaire compilation (Appendix 5) of the study states that eighty-eight officers were queried.² Their ranks were from lieutenant colonel to second lieutenant and they served in twelve armored divisions

and three separate tank battalions. Tankers answered tank questions and the infantry officers replied to infantry questions. The questions ranged from weapons and weapon density to organization and number of officers in companies.³

The question of importance to cavalry was question number 6, shown below:

6. What reconnaissance unit should there be in:⁴
 - a. The tank bn: (give size and component elements)
 - b. The armored infantry bn: (give size and component elements)

The answers to the questions are revealing insofar as equipment is concerned. In response to the tank battalion question twelve officers replied they should have armored cars and 1/4 ton trucks; twenty-one replied light tanks and 1/4 tons. These experienced armor combat leaders preferred a tank almost 2 to 1. The infantry officers showed a similar reaction favoring tanks and 1/4 tons over armored cars and 1/4 tons 25 to 14. Of the twenty-five favoring tanks twelve selected the light tank and 13 the heavy tank.⁵

It is here that a trend to a combined arms cavalry unit is seen. The reasons for this are well covered in the mechanized cavalry report.

Before leaving the armored division report one other finding is important to note since it has a bearing on doctrine and cavalry organization. The group analyzed the armored division afteraction reports to determine the typical tactical formation of the armored divisions; sixteen division formations were shown. Of these, eleven of the formations used three combat commands committed with two task forces each. Of the remainder, three were classic "two up one back" (two combat commands forward with two task forces, one in reserve) and two used three combat commands forward with eight and

nine task forces. Employment of the division is important when structuring a cavalry unit to support it. This will be discussed further, later.

The mechanized cavalry study is almost twice as long as the armored division study and has much more detail. This can be attributed to the efforts of two former mechanized cavalry group commanders: Colonel William J. Biddle, former Commander of the 113th Cavalry Group Mechanized, and Colonel C. H. (Hank) Reed, former Commander of the 2d Cavalry Group Mechanized, writing to Wyndham Kemp White of El Paso, Texas. Colonel Biddle stated:

You might know that in the fall of 1945, I was attached on temporary duty with the General Board of USFET. My assignment was to the armored section and my particular task was to prepare a study on the operations of mechanized cavalry during the fight in the European theater. I was assisted principally by Colonel C. H. (Hank) Reed, who as you know, commanded the 2d Cavalry Group during the war. We made a most exhaustive examination.

The scope of the study as shown in the agenda published by the armored section on 5 September 1945, was as follows:

- (2) Scope: Report will include investigation and consideration of the following.
 - (a) The general mission and future role of mechanized cavalry units.
 - (b) What should be the general organization of mechanized cavalry units, i.e., regiment, group, squadron and combinations.
 - (c) Armament and equipment of mechanized cavalry units.
 - (d) What changes are desired in present tactical doctrine for employment in mechanized cavalry?⁷

Included also in the agenda for the study was a list of thirteen questions pertaining to scope as outlined.

The task was no piece of cake because of the numbers of cavalry units in the theater. There were thirteen mechanized cavalry groups, thirteen mechanized cavalry squadrons organic to the light armored divisions, two armored reconnaissance battalions belonging to the heavy armored divisions, one unattached mechanized reconnaissance squadron, and forty-two mechanized

cavalry reconnaissance troops organic to the infantry divisions, a total of seventy-one units.

To understand the study, it is important to look at the doctrine as it existed for the employment of cavalry units. As stated by the study:

3. Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique of Mechanized Cavalry at Time of Invasion of Normandy.

a. Mission and role.

(1) The prescribed mission of mechanized cavalry when the invasion of Normandy began was reconnaissance, and this mission was to be performed with a minimum of fighting.

(2) Paragraph 38 of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, expressed the mechanized cavalry role as follows:

Mechanized cavalry units are organized, equipped and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.

(3) Mechanized cavalry units had been organized and equipped upon the basis of this role and its accomplishment and hence had been reduced to minimum strength in respect to both personnel and equipment. . . .⁸

It is immediately apparent to the modern cavalryman that security and economy of force missions were not mentioned. This study showed that pure reconnaissance was the least performed mission during the entire war in Europe!

The term pure reconnaissance is used because reconnaissance is inherent in every mission. The most striking fact is that units fought to obtain information during World War II. In spite of modern technology there is no reason to believe that the same will not be true during the next war.

What missions did the cavalry units perform during the war? The study classified the missions into five categories--offensive combat, defensive combat, reconnaissance, security and special arms.

Offensive combat included the attack, exploitation and pursuit. The study estimated that the various units conducted offensive missions as shown here expressed as a percentage of time.

Mechanized Cavalry Group (MCG)	10%
Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons (SQDN) and Armored Reconnaissance Battalions (BN)	4%
Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops	1%

Defensive combat included defense, delay and holding key terrain until the main force arrived. Expressed as a percentage of time by unit it was:

MCG	33%
SQDN/BN	11%
Troop	4%

Reconnaissance was not elaborated, except the study noted that accomplishment of a reconnaissance mission normally involved offensive combat. For this reason, it is likely that if any doubt existed, a mission was probably listed as offensive. Pure reconnaissance listed by percentage was:

MCG	3%
SQDN/BN	13%
Troop	6%

Security missions were conducted for the other arms and included blocking, moving and stationary screen, flank guard, maintaining contact between large units and filling gaps. Units conducted these missions as shown:

MCG	25%
SQDN/BN	24%
Troop	50%

Special operations was kind of a "catch all" category and included those missions that didn't fit in the other missions. They were: acting as a mobile reserve, security and control of the rear areas and operating an Army information service. The Army information service was a technique borrowed from the British. Units were used to go forward in small groups

or single vehicles and report on the front line situation directly to the commander using them.⁹ The estimated percentage of special operations was:

MCG	23%
SQDN/BN	48%
Troop	39%

The study brings out some other important factors involving the use of cavalry which had to have impacted on the recommended organizations. In the cavalry groups the ratio of mounted employment days to dismounted employment days was 1 to 1.8. This is significant because the units were lightly manned resulting in dismounted efforts that were undermanned. When the cavalry group conducted economy of force missions (offense and defense) and security missions they were normally reinforced with a field artillery battalion, a battalion of tank destroyers and an engineer company. Troop and companies of the squadrons and battalions were frequently detached for use by a combat command or task force. The squadrons and battalions were frequently used as a reserve.

Section 2 of the first chapter of the study summed up the capabilities of mechanized cavalry units. Paragraph 7 stated:

. . . Operations were not limited to reconnaissance, nor did such develop to be the primary mission of the arm.

b. (1) Instead it is found that mechanized cavalry units executed, generally with creditable success, most of the traditional combat missions of the cavalry--namely, to quote paragraph 34 of Field Manual 100-5:

Offensive combat: exploitation and pursuit; seizing and holding important terrain . . . arrival of . . . main forces, ground reconnaissance; . . . screening . . . ; security for . . . other forces . . . ; delaying action; covering . . . retrograde movements of other forces; combat liaison between large units; acting as a mobile reserve for other forces; harassing action; and surprise action against designated objectives deep in hostile rear areas.

(2) In addition mechanized cavalry units defended extensively, both on river lines and elsewhere; and their offensive operations included attacks against fortified localities and river lines, night combat and fighting in towns, woods, mountains and snow.¹⁰

This part of the study again goes into reconnaissance in some detail. In summary it restated that reconnaissance was usually conducted in conjunction with other combat missions and that the units had to fight for the information. Seldom did situations arise where the cavalry units could precede the combat battalions at an effective range. It concludes with an observation that the squadrons and troops were not manned sufficiently to conduct dismounted operations.

Understanding the missions performed by the cavalry is key to comprehending why the board recommended the organizations they did. Prior to discussing the recommendations on organization of the units the board examined the characteristics of the units. This was broken down into categories. They were mobility, fire power, adaptability and flexibility, self-sufficiency and fighting ability. In these categories the units were found adequate, however some problems were discussed.

The armored car was unable to move across country fast. Supporting equipment (medium tanks and tank destroyers) were too heavy and did not have the range required. The primary weapon of the armored car was inadequate, the 60mm mortar, too small, and the 37mm gun on the light tank was also inadequate. The bursting radius of the assault guns' 75mm round was not big enough.¹¹

The units were flexible and adaptable. However, as noted earlier they had to be reinforced by artillery, tank destroyers and engineers. They were hampered by a lack of transport for resupply. The two squadron mechanized cavalry groups had difficulty sustaining prolonged combat missions because no reserve was available.


Another interesting comment regarding reconnaissance was noted under fighting ability. The study concluded:

Furthermore, the fact that mechanized cavalry units had been imbued, in training, with the mission of reconnaissance and the doctrine of accomplishing that mission with a minimum of fighting, caused some mechanized cavalry units to commence their operations with a mental obstacle to offensive combat.¹²

A point worth remembering, especially if the unit is undergunned or does not have the supporting weapons needed to defeat the enemy.

What were the recommendations of the board regarding organization of cavalry units? The board recommended that the mechanized cavalry group be made a regiment of three squadrons and become a corps unit (instead of being attached from the field army); and that both the armored and armored infantry divisions be given a squadron of cavalry. The cavalry squadrons of the regiment and those of the divisions were organized the same insofar as subordinate units were concerned. It should come as no surprise that these squadrons were a combined arms team that could fight on the battlefield.


The regiments were organized as shown:



There are two items worthy of note in the organization of the regimental headquarters. An air liaison section was included which would have three L5 airplanes and six L4 airplanes. The headquarters also had a security platoon consisting of one officer and forty-two enlisted. Otherwise it consisted of the command group, staff sections and communications platoon.

The headquarters troop consisted of three sections: Troop headquarters; administration, mess and supply; and a maintenance section.

The armored cavalry squadrons were organized as follows:



The divisional squadron had more strength in the headquarters and headquarters and service troop than did the regimental squadron which had only headquarters and headquarters troop. This difference was accounted for the divisional squadron not having a regimental headquarters to support it. The divisional squadron HQ and HQ and service troop was authorized fourteen officers, three warrant officers (S1, S4 and maintenance) and 157 enlisted. The regimental unit had eleven officers, no warrants and 107 enlisted.

The cavalry troops were identical in both squadrons. The recommended troop had a headquarters platoon and three cavalry platoons. The headquarters platoon consisted of the command and communication section; the administration, mess and supply section; and the maintenance section.

The cavalry platoons also had three sections. The first was a command and support section with three vehicles: a 1/4 ton for the platoon leader, an armored car for the platoon sergeant and a personnel carrier. The personnel carrier carried a composite ten-man squad armed with an 81mm mortar and a Browning Automatic Rifle.

The other two cavalry platoon sections were identical. Each had an armored car for the section sergeant and two 1/4 ton trucks with a 30 caliber machine gun each.

The cavalry platoon was light but relatively heavily armed: three armored cars, one personnel carrier and five 1/4 tons. The main weapons

systems were the three 37mm guns in the armored cars, three 30 caliber machine guns co-axially mounted in the armored cars, five 30 caliber machine guns (four on the 1/4 tons and one ground-mounted) and five 50 caliber machine guns (three on the armored cars and two carried in the 1/4 tons).

The dragoon troops were also identical in both types of squadrons. This unit was obviously an attempt to surmount the lack of infantrymen in the units during the war. This was the largest unit (six officers and 191 enlisted) in the squadrons. The dragoon troop had a headquarters platoon, three dragoon platoons and a mortar platoon. The headquarters platoon contained the standard sections; the dragoon platoon had a command section and three dragoon squads. The platoon leader and three enlisted men rode in a 1/4 ton truck. The thirteen man squads rode in personnel carriers. The squad had a squad leader, assistant squad leader, a driver, two BAR men and eight riflemen. The mortar platoon was composed of a command section (a platoon leader, platoon sergeant and two enlisted) in a 1/4 ton and three 5-man mortar squads each having a personnel carrier and an 81mm mortar.

The light tank troops were again identical. The organization of these units are strikingly similar to our current (non division 86) organization-- a headquarters platoon and three tank platoons. Two tanks in the headquarters and five in each platoon.

The howitzer troops of the squadrons were markedly different. Each of them, of course, had the standard headquarters section; command and communications section; administration, mess and supply section; and maintenance section. The regimental squadron had three gun platoons each with a platoon headquarters, two gun sections and an ammunition section. Each gun section had one 105mm howitzer, SP. The regimental squadron, therefore, had a six-howitzer troop. But, the troop also had a tank destroyer platoon consisting of a headquarters and six M-18, 76mm tank destroyers. The divisional

howitzer troop did not have a tank destroyer platoon. It did, however, have a fourth gun platoon for a total of eight howitzers.

It should be noted the General Board recommendations for the infantry division (study number 15) and the armored division (study number 48) used the term "assault gun" rather than howitzer troop. The organization was the same and each had eight 105mm self-propelled howitzers.

Before leaving the organization of units it is interesting to note what the board recommended in regards to reconnaissance in the divisions other than the cavalry squadron. The subject was briefly covered in study 15.

A conference on the infantry division was held at the Grand Hotel, Bad Nauheim, Germany on 20 November 1945. General George S. Patton, Jr. chaired the conference. Forty-four officers attended the meeting. There was one General (Patton), one lieutenant general, five major generals, seven brigadier generals, eighteen colonels, eleven lieutenant colonels, one captain and a chaplain. The first question General Patton asked after the proposed organizations had been covered was:

General Patton:

What reconnaissance, if any, is there in an armored regiment?

Lieutenant Colonel Fries:

Just the reconnaissance platoons that they had before, increased by five men in each platoon.¹³

General Patton did not respond to the answer. Unfortunately study 15 neglected to show in enough detail the reconnaissance platoon organization. It was not until the armored division study that it was covered in detail.

The armored division study proposed reconnaissance platoons at the regimental level and one for each of the battalions. A total of four in each of the three regiments (one at regimental level, one in the tank battalion and one in each of the two armored rifle battalions). These

platoons were to be organized the same as the platoon in the cavalry troop of the divisional squadron.

Clearly the intent of the General Board was to provide mounted combined arms cavalry units at corps and division levels and a reconnaissance capability at regiment and battalion levels.

What doctrine was to be used for the cavalry units? Chapter three of the study concluded:

28. General Mission, Tactical Doctrine and Technique, and Future Role of Mechanized Cavalry.

a. (1) That the mission which was assigned to the mechanized cavalry, reconnaissance with minimum of fighting, was unsound.

(2) That the mission of mechanized cavalry should be combat.

b. That the tactical doctrine of mechanized cavalry should be generally that prescribed in Chapter 1 of Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry.

c. That the technique of mechanized cavalry should be based generally on the provisions of Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, except where its provisions apply particularly to horse cavalry.

d. That the future role of mechanized cavalry should be the traditional cavalry role of a highly mobile, heavily armed and lightly equipped combat force, and the capability of mechanized cavalry, particularly that normally operating under the corps, to perform that role, should be exploited.¹⁴

FM 100-5 Operations coverage of the role of the cavalry was covered earlier. FM 2-15 listed the cavalry missions as:

4. Missions - The missions of cavalry include--

a. Offensive combat, including attack, pursuit, and exploitation of a breakthrough.

b. Defensive combat, including defense, delaying action, and holding important terrain until arrival of other forces.

c. Reconnaissance.

d. Security for other arms, including counter reconnaissance and covering actions.

e. Special operations, such as filling gaps, constituting a mobile reserve for other forces, and for providing liaison between large forces.¹⁵

It is quite clear that the combat leaders of World War II, although they sometimes disagreed on details, intended that cavalry units be a combined arms team capable of independent combat on the battlefield. Subsequent actions after the war reduced the level of combined arms from the squadron level to platoon by instituting a scout section (four vehicles), tank section (two tanks), infantry squad (one personnel carrier) and mortar squad (one mortar carrier) in all cavalry platoons and the battalion reconnaissance platoons of the armored and mechanized divisions. The regimental squadrons kept the tank companies and artillery batteries in their organizations. The divisional squadrons did not.

There has been an erosion of the combined arms concept over the years since the end of the war in Vietnam. First the rifle squads were eliminated when it was decided to "heavy up" by adding two more tanks to the platoons. Then tanks were eliminated from the battalion cavalry reconnaissance platoons and now under Division 86 the divisional squadrons lose their tanks and an entire ground troop.

The only encouraging note in current cavalry organizational thinking is the proposed cavalry regiment organization. The addition of the air cavalry squadron and improvement in combat service support will enhance the ability of the regiments to fight and are positive steps. The consolidation of the artillery batteries into a battalion is clearly a waste of personnel and equipment.

The reorganization of the regimental armored cavalry troops into four platoons (two four tank platoons with the Abrams tank and two cavalry platoons with four cavalry fighting vehicles) is a hotly debated subject.

If a vote were taken among cavalymen it would probably result in a fifty/fifty split between the proposed organization and a combined arms mix at platoon level. Regardless of the organization the important fact is that the troops still have the means to fight without augmentation.

The decision to eliminate the tanks in the divisional squadrons and to adopt a two air cavalry troop and two ground troops organization is clearly a giant step backwards. The additional air cavalry troop is welcome, however, it should not be added at the expense of a ground troop. Three maneuver brigades require three ground cavalry troops. Quoting Major General E. N. Harmon when he was Commanding General of XXII Corps:

Each squadron should have . . . three reconnaissance troops, one light tank troop, and an assault gun troop as at present. . . . I repeatedly had to bolster up the mechanized cavalry groups either with tank destroyers or medium tanks so as to give them gun power to meet the heavier tank which they practically always encountered. When the enemy is retreating and the cavalry is pursuing, if a few tanks or self-propelled guns are placed at advantageous points, they must either be knocked out or the pursuit is stopped. Also the cavalry is called upon to cover the flanks and very frequently is attacked by small groups of heavy tanks which it must be able to destroy or the flank will be penetrated.¹⁶

Current cavalry doctrine is certainly adequate, however there is too much emphasis on pure reconnaissance missions. Reconnaissance is an integral part of all missions and this should be stressed in field manuals and training.

The movement to contact and the resultant meeting engagement need to be added. In a fluid battle situation division and corps commanders will look to their cavalry units to find, destroy (if possible) or fix enemy forces.

The proposed changing of the divisional squadron's mission to reconnaissance and surveillance is a mistake. If the division 86 cavalry squadron becomes a reality nothing will have been learned from history.

The G-3's answer to his commanders question at the beginning of this paper should have been.

"General we didn't pay enough attention to history. Otherwise we wouldn't have structured your cavalry squadron the way it is now. Maybe we should have made the studies of the Army General Board, European Theater mandatory reading for force developers and doctrine writers."

ENDNOTES

1. The General Board, United States European Theater, Study Number 48, "Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division," Chapter 5, p. 22.
2. Author's Note: A list of officers in the appendix totals 90 so a slight discrepancy exists. Perhaps two did not reply.
3. Professional Note: When asked how many tanks should there be in a tank platoon 43 said 5, 2 said 6, 9 said 4, and 6 said 3.
4. The General Board, Study 48, Appendix 5, p. 2.
5. Author's Note: The total response for infantry officers and tankers only total 72. Again either all did not reply or did not answer the question.
6. Letter dated 9 August 1949, from Colonel W. S. Biddle to Wyndham Kemp White, El Paso, Texas, in response to White's letter concerning the cavalry in World War II from the personal file of W. S. Biddle, US Army Military History Institute.
7. Agenda, dated 2 September 1945, Armored Section, The General Board from the personal file of W. S. Biddle US Army Military History Institute.
8. The General Board, ETO, report 49, paragraph 3, Chapter 1, p. 5.
9. Author's Note: General Patton was subjected to this technique as a corps commander in Africa and raised hell about it. He used it as the Third Army Commander.
10. The General Board ETO, report 49 paragraph 7, section 2, Chapter 1, p. 9.
11. Author's Note: The 81mm mortar and the 75mm gun for the light tank were introduced in some units prior to the end of the war.
12. The General Board ETO, report 49, paragraph 7 C.(3)(b) section 2, Chapter 1, p. 11.
13. The General Board, ETO, Study Number 15, Minutes of Conference on the Infantry Division, p. 3.
14. The General Board, ETO, Study Number 49, Chapter 3, p. 20.
15. FM 2-15, "Cavalry Field Manual," 8 April 1941, Chapter 1, paragraph 4, p. 5.
16. The General Board, ETO, Study Number 49, Appendix 15, pp. 2-3.